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Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility1 
Alex Voorhoeve 
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE 
a.e.voorhoeve [at] lse.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of a person’s opportunities to choose in the justification of social 
arrangements. Common judgment gives these opportunities a justificatory role: it holds, for 
example, that we should prioritise preventing harm that people cannot avoid by choosing 
appropriately over preventing harm that they can so avoid. Thomas Scanlon argues that such 
judgments should be explained with reference to the value of a person’s opportunities to choose: if 
a person is given opportunities which generally lead people to avoid the harm in question, then, 
Scanlon argues, this can make it the case that she cannot complain about what results from her 
choices. 
I argue that while Scanlon is right to focus on the value of a person’s opportunities, his way of 
determining their value is flawed. Instead, I argue, we should evaluate a person’s opportunity set by 
taking account of the various outcomes that she can achieve by choosing from this set and how 
well placed she is, given her dispositions to choose, to achieve the good and avoid the bad 
outcomes. I argue that this view can explain why we should prioritise preventing harm that people 
cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over preventing harm that they can so avoid. I also argue 
that it can account for the importance of protecting people against choices through which they 
might come to harm. 
 
Word count: 8,600 
Key words: responsibility; choice; ranking opportunity sets; Scanlon’s contractualism. 
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Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility 
 
Introduction 
 
What role do a person’s opportunities to choose play in the justification of social 
arrangements? We need to answer this question in order to arrive at a theory of substantive 
responsibility, which tells us the way in which a person’s claims on others, others’ claims on 
her, and the quality of her situation should depend on the opportunities she has and the 
choices she makes.2 To get a handle on this question, consider the following case, which is 
adapted from an example of Thomas Scanlon’s.3 Imagine that we are public officials 
responsible for the removal and transport to a remote, safe location, of some recently 
discovered, naturally occurring hazardous material from a town. Though the excavation site 
will be fenced off, and the excavation and transport will be carried out with care, the 
removal of this material will inevitably release harmful particles into the air, which, if 
inhaled, will cause lung damage. Workers involved in the removal will be protected by 
special equipment, and the inhabitants of the town will be safe if they stay away from the 
excavation site and stay indoors on the day when the excavation and transport will take 
place.  
 Suppose that we have two options. Our first option is to have a very thorough 
information campaign, which will ensure that everyone in the town receives a standard 
warning message and can take the necessary steps to protect themselves. (Call this policy 
Inform Everyone.) From our knowledge of similar situations, we can confidently predict 
that almost everyone will indeed protect themselves, but that there will be one person, 
though we can’t know who this person is, who will visit the excavation site even though 
she is aware of the danger to her health, because the standard warning aroused her curiosity 
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about the nature of the hazardous material and the process of excavation. As a 
consequence, she will develop a severe and incurable case of emphysema. (Call her 
Curious.) 
 The second policy is to spend more money on each individual sign, leaflet and 
announcement, in order to describe the effects of exposure with particularly vivid and 
persuasive images. (Call this policy Vivid Warning.) On the basis of our knowledge of 
similar situations, we can confidently predict that these images will move everyone who 
receives the warning—even those who are especially curious—to heed it. However, 
because the leaflets and announcements will be more costly to produce, the campaign’s 
coverage will be somewhat less extensive. As a consequence, though an attempt will be 
made to reach everyone, we can confidently predict that one person will remain 
uninformed and will be outside on his daily stroll. (Call this person Walker. Again, suppose 
we don’t know who this person will be.) 
  Suppose that Curious and Walker are equally well-off prior to the hazardous material 
removal, and that the harm suffered by Curious under Inform Everyone is just as great as 
the harm suffered by Walker under Vivid Warning. The characteristics of these individuals’ 
opportunity sets and their levels of welfare under these two policies can then be 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Two individuals’ opportunity sets and outcomes under two policies.  
Policy 
 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone 
 
Opportunity set      Outcome 
Vivid Warning 
 
Opportunity set      Outcome 
Walker 1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as 
best option; does 
not find (2) 
tempting. 
 
Long, healthy life. 1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Not informed of 
consequences. 
 
Severe, permanent 
health problems. 
Curious  1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; is 
strongly tempted 
by (2). 
 
Severe, permanent 
health problems. 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as 
best option; is 
somewhat 
tempted by (2), 
but does not find 
it difficult to resist 
temptation. 
Long, healthy life. 
 
 Which policy, if any, should we prefer? I take it that a common response would be 
that we should give priority to preventing the harm that Walker would suffer under Vivid 
Warning over preventing the harm that Curious would suffer under Inform Everyone, 
because under the latter policy, Curious would be in a position to avoid the harm by 
choosing appropriately, whereas under the former policy, Walker would not be.4 
 In this paper, I aim to formulate a perspective on the justificatory role of a person’s 
opportunities to choose that adequately accounts for this judgment and other related case 
judgments. My discussion will proceed through a critical examination of Scanlon’s views on 
the topic. In section 1, I examine Scanlon’s Value of Choice view, which holds that if a 
person is given opportunities which generally lead people to avoid harm, then this alone is 
sufficient to make it the case that she has no valid complaint about what results.5 I argue 
that Scanlon is not justified in assessing the value of a person’s opportunities by the value 
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of the things people generally achieve when faced with these opportunities, and that the 
Value of Choice view cannot, therefore, provide a reason for favouring Inform Everyone 
over Vivid Warning.  
In section 2, I examine the Forfeiture view, which Scanlon regards as a rival 
perspective on substantive responsibility. This view holds that someone cannot complain 
of harm that she suffers only because of her voluntary choice.6 I argue that we should reject 
this view because it pays insufficient attention to the importance of protecting people 
against harm which they might incur through unwise choices.  
In section 3, I propose what I call the Potential Value of Opportunities view, which 
holds that in justifying social arrangements, we should attend to the potential value of a 
person’s opportunity set. This value depends on the various outcomes that he can achieve 
by choosing from this set, and on how well placed he is, given his dispositions to choose, 
to achieve the good and avoid the bad outcomes. I argue that this view can explain why we 
should prioritise preventing harm that people cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over 
preventing harm that they can so avoid, and can also explain why it is important to protect 
people against choices through which they might come to harm. 
 
 
1. The Value of Choice view 
 
Scanlon characterises his Value of Choice account as follows: 
“According to the Value of Choice account what matters is the value of the 
opportunity to choose that the person is presented with. If a person has been 
placed in a sufficiently good position, this can make it the case that he or she has 
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no valid complaint about what results, whether or not it is produced by his or her 
active choice.”7  
 Scanlon proposes that we determine the value of a person’s opportunities to choose 
with reference to “the positive reasons that people have for wanting opportunities to make 
choices”, and he distinguishes three such reasons.8 The first is what he calls the instrumental 
value of choice: the value choice has in securing states of affairs that we have reason to 
seek. This value is conditional on the degree to which for a given object of choice, a 
person’s capacities, dispositions and conditions of choice will help him achieve the ends he 
has reason to seek. It is also relative: it depends on the usefulness of his being given a 
choice as compared to other means of achieving these ends. 
 The second is the representative value of choice. This is the value we put on seeing 
features of ourselves manifested in our actions and their results. Examples are gifts, where 
the significance of the gift is determined by having chosen it oneself, and creative work, 
where part of the point of the work is that it reflects its author’s attitudes and abilities.  
 The third is the symbolic value of choice. We may want outcomes to depend on our 
choices not merely because this will be a more efficient way of achieving our ends, or 
because we want our choices to reflect our values, thoughts and capacities, but also because 
not having such choices would be taken as an indicator that we are not competent to make 
them. 
 Though it may well be that we should add further values to this list, I will follow 
Scanlon in attending to these values alone. Indeed, in the context of our hazardous waste 
removal case, I will follow Scanlon in assuming that only the first of these three values 
applies. As he writes: 
“The Value of Choice account that I am proposing explains the role of choice in 
the justification of moral principles by appealing to the reasons (…) we have for 
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wanting outcomes to depend on the way we respond when presented with 
alternatives. In the present case these reasons are purely instrumental. (…) So 
according to the Value of Choice account ‘giving people the choice’ is, like the 
fences, the careful removal techniques, and the remote location of the new site, 
just another means through which the likelihood of injury is reduced.”9  
 Given this assumption, Scanlon recognises that it would be natural to conclude that in 
the context of this example, a person’s circumstances of choice are good when they lead 
her to avoid harm, and bad when they do not.10 This would mean that Curious’ 
circumstances of choice under Inform Everyone are bad, because her receipt of this 
warning does not decrease the likelihood of her coming to harm, since, as Scanlon puts it, 
“the [standard] warning only aroused her impetuous curiosity, and she would have been 
better off if she had never been told at all.”11 Given that her circumstances of choice would 
appear to be bad from the perspective of the one value relevant to their assessment, it 
would seem that on the Value of Choice view, we cannot appeal to the quality of these 
circumstances to discount the harm suffered by Curious under Inform Everyone. It 
therefore seems that the Value of Choice view cannot regard the fact that Curious would 
be informed under Inform Everyone and that Walker would not be under Vivid Warning 
as a reason to choose Inform Everyone. 
Scanlon responds to this line of argument as follows. Curious is placed in a sufficiently 
good situation when she receives the standard warning (as she would under Inform 
Everyone) just because being given the standard warning is generally speaking a good thing. 
As he puts it: 
“The reason why it is important that this woman was informed of the danger, and 
thus given the chance of avoiding it, is not that this was necessarily advantageous 
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to her but rather that it is something that people in general have reason to 
value.”12 
The reason that receiving the standard warning is something people in general have reason 
to value is that “it is generally sufficient to lead people to avoid coming to harm.”13 
 By contrast, Scanlon writes, Walker is not placed in a comparably good situation under 
Vivid Warning: 
“[B]ecause we did not succeed in making him aware of the danger, we did not 
make what happened to him depend on his response to this information. Given 
that this dependence is something we all would reasonably want to have under the 
circumstances, we did not succeed in making this person as well off as one would 
reasonably want to be.”14 
 In sum, given that receiving the standard warning is generally beneficial, because people 
generally respond to it by avoiding the harm in question, we can regard Curious’ situation 
under Inform Everyone as sufficiently good to make it the case that she has no valid 
complaint about the harm that results. Under Vivid Warning, by contrast, Walker would be 
able to complain of the harm he comes to because he was not warned, and being warned 
generally leads one to avoid harm. If Scanlon’s appeal to the general value of a person’s 
opportunities were justified, we would therefore have reason to favour Inform Everyone 
over Vivid Warning. But is it? 
 Scanlon justifies it by arguing that in assessing a person’s situation, we should only 
appeal to what he calls “generic reasons (…) that we can see that people have in virtue of 
certain general characteristics” rather than to “the reasons that a specific individual may 
have, given all the facts about his or her situation.”15 Scanlon offers two reasons for 
appealing to generic reasons in evaluating a person’s situation. The first is that that not all 
of a person’s preferences and projects give rise to moral claims on us; we only owe others 
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goods that are useful across wide range of views of the good life, such as goods required to 
develop one’s capacities, to lead the life one wants with family and friends, and to achieve 
success in one’s main endeavours. We also owe them more specific goods like health, 
leisure, and wealth, which are generally judged to be important elements of a good life.16 
This consideration, however, only establishes that in evaluating the quality of Curious’ 
options, we need not consider the satisfaction of her curiosity as something which counts 
in favour of a policy like Inform Everyone under which she visits the excavation site. It 
does not give us reason to regard Curious as having been placed in good circumstances of 
choice under Inform Everyone. For she will suffer damage to her health, and this is among 
the ways in which a person is affected that Scanlon regards as giving rise to legitimate 
claims. 
 Scanlon’s second reason is that taking into account specific variations in people’s needs 
and circumstances would be more demanding than just paying attention to general 
characteristics; it would lead to greater uncertainty about whether everyone’s claims had 
been met and require everyone to gather more information in order to know what moral 
principles give to and require of them. Since this uncertainty and information gathering are 
costly, we are permitted to refer to generic reasons in the justification of our actions.17  
 I do not think, however, that this cost can be successfully appealed to in order to justify 
regarding Curious’ opportunities to choose under Inform Everyone as valuable. For the 
information we have assumed is available in our case—information about the overall 
pattern of behaviour induced in a given population by various ways of warning them—is 
commonly and justifiably gathered and used in public decision-making.18 (Recall that 
“Curious” is simply a placeholder for the anonymous individual who we know will come to 
harm under a particular policy, so that no special assumptions are involved about 
knowledge of named individuals’ dispositions to choose.) It therefore seems that we are 
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entitled to use this information to conclude that Curious’ receipt of the standard warning 
does not increase her likelihood of avoiding harm and therefore does not benefit her. 
 In sum, the Value of Choice account is unable to offer a convincing explanation why 
the fact that Curious would be warned under Inform Everyone places her in a better 
situation than Walker would be under Vivid Warning. It is therefore unable to explain why 
we should choose Inform Everyone in this case. 
 
 
2. The Forfeiture view 
 
This failing of the Value of Choice view should lead us to examine the view that Scanlon 
regards as its closest competitor, which he calls the Forfeiture view. Scanlon characterises 
this view as follows: 
“a person who could have chosen to avoid a certain outcome, but who knowingly 
passed up this choice, cannot complain of the result: volenti non fit iniuria.”19 
 Concerning the situation Curious would be in under Inform Everyone, Scanlon writes 
that a proponent of the Forfeiture view would reason as follows: 
“Since she had been warned of the danger, and chose to go to the site anyway, we 
are inclined to say that she is (substantively) responsible for her own injury; and it 
is this fact, rather than the amount that has been done to protect her or the cost 
to others of doing more, that makes it the case that she cannot blame anyone for 
what happened. By choosing, in the face of warnings, to go to the excavation site, 
she laid down her right to complain of the harm she suffered as a result.”20  
 The core idea of the Forfeiture view, then, is that someone who is well-informed and 
has an accessible option that it is reasonable to take and through which she would avoid 
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coming to harm, but who freely makes a conscious choice to pass up this option, cannot 
complain if she ends up badly as a result. This core idea no doubt requires some 
qualification. A defender of the Forfeiture view would presumably want to allow someone 
to complain of harm that they suffered only because of their choice of a particular 
alternative if there was no good reason for the harm to be connected to that alternative. We 
should therefore assume that there is adequate justification for the connection between the 
harm and the person’s action. In the context of our example, this condition is met, because 
we assumed the case for removing the hazardous material was overwhelming, and that 
there was no way to remove the material without affecting the health of people who 
ventured outside during its excavation and transport. This means that, on the Forfeiture 
view, while Walker can complain of the harm he would suffer under Vivid Warning, 
Curious cannot complain of the harm she would incur under Inform Everyone. If we then 
assume, as it seems natural to do, that we should choose a policy which does not impose a 
burden of which someone can complain over a policy which does impose a burden of 
which someone can complain, then it follows that we should choose Inform Everyone 
over Vivid Warning. The Forfeiture view therefore offers an explanation of the common 
judgment with which we began. 
 Scanlon offers two points of criticism of the Forfeiture view. The first is that it places 
undue weight on the special legitimating force of voluntary action.21 What is important, 
Scanlon claims, is a person’s opportunity to choose, rather than his conscious decision to 
pass up specific alternatives. Scanlon argues that we should appeal to the former rather 
than the latter because there are cases in which it seems right to offer the options a person 
has as part of the justification of an arrangement under which he ends up badly through an 
action of his own, even if he never consciously considers all relevant aspects of this action. 
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We can illustrate this with the following case, which is again adapted from Scanlon’s 
discussion.22 
 Imagine that in our hazardous material example, we can confidently predict that under 
both Inform Everyone and Vivid Warning there will be a person—whose identity, again, 
we do not know—who, though he was warned, and though generally of sound mind and 
capable of remembering things and running his own affairs, will simply forget the warning. 
(Call this person Forgetful.) As a result, he will be outside exercising during the transport of 
the material and suffer damage to his health. 
 Scanlon argues that the case of Forgetful illustrates that it is not active choice, but the 
quality of the circumstances in which a person was placed, that is of moral significance. 
For, he argues, Forgetful does not consciously decide to take a dangerous action; 
nevertheless, if he is warned, then, Scanlon believes, his claim should be treated like 
Curious’ claim, who makes a conscious decision to take the dangerous action: 
“If (…) enough was done to warn him, then this man is, like [Curious], fully 
responsible for what happens to him, even though he made no conscious decision 
to take the risk. From the fact that a person, under the right conditions, took a 
certain risk, we may conclude that he alone is responsible for what happens to 
him as a result. But this need not be seen as reflecting the special legitimating 
force of voluntary action, in the way that the Forfeiture view would suggest. The 
mere fact that he was placed in conditions in which he had the choice of avoiding 
the risk may be sufficient.”23 
 Contrary to what Scanlon seems to suggest, however, the case of Forgetful does not 
constitute a counterexample to the Forfeiture view. For Scanlon’s definition of the 
Forfeiture view specifies that informed choice under certain circumstances is a sufficient 
condition for not being able to complain of a result; not that it is a necessary condition for 
 13 
not being able to complain of it. Therefore, if Scanlon’s judgment about Forgetful is 
correct, then all this proves is that both informed, voluntary choice and negligence can be 
grounds for not being able to complain of a result of one’s actions. 
 Scanlon’s second objection to the Forfeiture view runs as follows. He points out that 
the Forfeiture view must stress the fact that Curious can do otherwise than she does under 
Inform Everyone. But, he argues, identifying this fact as the crucial one leads to 
implausible results in other cases, since, he writes,  
“there are many conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice 
despite the fact that a person choosing under such conditions still ‘could have 
done otherwise’ in any sense that would apply in this case.”24  
Scanlon gives the following example of a case in which there are such other conditions that 
undermine the legitimating force of choice:  
“It would, for example, be reasonable to reject a principle according to which a 
long-term contract is binding even when entered into by a fourteen-year-old 
without adult guidance. What is special about the case of fourteen-year-olds is not 
that they cannot choose wisely (after all, many of them do), but rather that they are 
so likely not to do so.” 25 
   The challenge Scanlon puts to the Forfeiture view is to explain what makes it the case 
that informed, voluntary choice does not play a justificatory role in the case of fourteen-
year-olds when it does play this role in the case of Curious under Inform Everyone, while 
not referring to the fact that fourteen-year-olds are unlikely to choose wisely—for that is 
also true of Curious under Inform Everyone. 
  A defender of the Forfeiture view could respond that Curious, like other normal 
adults, is assumed to have a certain amount of knowledge, experience, and certain cognitive 
capacities, like the ability to reflect coolly on what she will do and fully appreciate the 
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potential consequences, and a degree of self-control that fourteen-year-olds typically lack. 
This knowledge and these capacities are, like the availability of an accessible option through 
which one could avoid harm and that it would be reasonable to take, necessary conditions 
for choice to have the moral force the Forfeiture view accords it. Though, as the Forfeiture 
view theorist will readily acknowledge, these conditions usually make it likely that a person 
will choose well, their import is not reducible to their contribution to a person’s choosing 
well, or to any additional value that choice has. They simply make it reasonable for us to 
ask of people that they look out for themselves. In sum, Scanlon’s second objection lacks 
force because a defender of the Forfeiture view can happily agree with Scanlon’s claim that 
“there are many conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice despite the fact 
that a person choosing under such conditions still ‘could have done otherwise’.” 
 Though Scanlon’s objections to the Forfeiture view fail, there is, I believe, a more 
forceful objection to it: it appears to pay insufficient attention to the importance of 
protecting people against harm that they might incur through unwise choices.26 By way of 
illustration, consider again the situations of Walker and Curious, and suppose that while 
Vivid Warning is no longer an option, it becomes possible to excavate and transport the 
material by covering it in such a way that the particles released cause only minor harm on 
exposure (say, an unpleasant cough and concomitant limitations on some activities for a 
week, with no lasting effects; call this policy Low Emissions). Under Low Emissions, an 
attempt will be made inform everyone of the danger of visiting the excavation site and 
being outside during transport by issuing a standard warning. However, the cost of 
lowering emissions makes it impossible to ensure that everyone will receive this standard 
warning. Assume that, as a consequence, under Low Emissions, Walker will be taking a 
stroll during the transport because he is uninformed of the danger. Curious, by contrast, 
will receive the standard warning, but will stay inside because she knows the excavation and 
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transport are taking place under a cover and there will be no way for her to see what 
precisely is going on even if she were to visit the excavation site. The opportunity sets and 
outcomes associated with Inform Everyone and Low Emissions are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Two individuals’ opportunity sets and outcomes under two policies.  
Policy 
 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone 
 
Opportunity set      Outcome 
Low Emissions 
 
Opportunity set      Outcome 
Walker 1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as 
best option; does 
not find (2) 
tempting. 
 
Long, healthy life. 1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Not informed of 
consequences. 
 
Minor, temporary 
health problems. 
Curious  1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (2) 
is tempting and 
difficult to resist. 
 
Severe, permanent 
health problems. 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as 
best option; does 
not find (2) 
tempting. 
Long, healthy life. 
 
 From the Forfeiture view’s perspective, we should choose Inform Everyone, because 
no one could complain of the severe damage to their health that results from Inform 
Everyone, whereas Walker could complain of the minor harm he would suffer under Low 
Emissions. 
 I believe, by contrast, that we should choose Low Emissions over Inform Everyone in 
this case, and that the Forfeiture view is therefore mistaken. The reason it is mistaken is 
that it fails to adequately register that in one important respect, the situation in which 
Curious is placed under Inform Everyone is bad, because she will be strongly disposed to 
choose an option through which she will come to great harm. This means that under 
Inform Everyone, she is exposed to a significant danger, since there is a significant risk that 
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she will choose badly and suffer the consequences.27 We are all familiar with the idea that it 
is bad to be exposed to this type of danger, because we are familiar with various ways in 
which someone might choose badly in spite of being able to determine and pursue the best 
course of action. For one, a person might simply never take the time to think things 
through and work out what the best course of action is. (An example is Forgetful 
mentioned above, who, we can imagine, is occupied by other matters when he receives the 
warning, puts off thinking about what to do in the light of it until later, and then forgets it.) 
Alternatively, a person might deliberate about his options and fail in variety of ways to 
develop a proper appreciation of the relevant reasons for action, because his deliberation is 
clouded by excessive desire.28 He might, for example, talk himself into adopting certain 
false beliefs because he wants them to be true. (Think of an employee who, wanting to 
view X-rated web-pages while in the office persuades himself of the false belief that his 
boss would never find out if he did so.) Or, while in the grip of a desire, he might give the 
wrong weight to certain considerations. (An example is someone, who infatuated with a 
beautiful car that he cannot really afford, incorrectly regards the pleasure of owning it as 
outweighing the financial difficulties he knows that its purchase would impose on him.) Or 
he may arrive at the right conclusion through deliberation but fail to acquire the conviction 
that these beliefs should bring, because such conviction would lead to behaviour that is 
contrary to a strong desire. (An example is a smoker who believes the written warnings 
provided on cigarette packages and who concludes that he should stop smoking, but 
because of his fondness for smoking, fails to develop the conviction that he should stop 
smoking until confronted with vivid images of people wasting away from lung cancer.) 
Finally, he may arrive at the right conclusion through deliberation but fail to abide by it 
because of weakness of will. 
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 Curious’ situation under Inform Everyone should be understood as one in which she 
suffers from weakness of will, or is prone to at least one of the aforementioned desire-
induced failures to acquire the proper conviction that she should stay inside during the 
excavation and transport of the material. A good account of the justificatory role of a 
person’s opportunities should take note of this way in which Curious’ circumstances of 
choice under Inform Everyone are less than ideal, because in cases like this, where our 
policies inevitably shape people’s circumstances of choice, people have a claim to be placed 
in circumstances in which they are disposed to choose well and to avoid harm. The 
Forfeiture view should be rejected, I believe, because it does not recognise claims of this 
kind. In the following section, I attempt to develop a view that does recognise such claims. 
 
 
3. The Potential Value of Opportunities view 
 
On what I will call the Potential Value of Opportunities view, when a person is in a 
position to freely and capably make an informed choice, we assess her situation not by the 
outcome she achieves but by what I will call the potential value of her opportunities.29 This 
value depends on the value of the various things that she can achieve through her choices, 
as well as on how disposed she is to choose her better options and avoid her worse 
options. By contrast, when someone cannot reasonably be expected to choose differently 
than she does, then this account is only concerned with how she ends up. 
 In the context of our example, this view holds that we should look at the potential 
value of the opportunities that Walker has under Inform Everyone, as well as the potential 
value of the opportunities that Curious has under Inform Everyone, Vivid Warning and 
Low Emissions, and not at the outcomes they achieve through their choices from these 
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opportunities. For in all these cases, Walker and Curious have the information and 
capacities required to avoid harm by choosing appropriately. The Potential Value of 
Opportunities view also requires that we look only at how Walker ends up under Vivid 
Warning and Low Emissions, because under these policies he cannot reasonably have been 
expected to avoid coming to harm by choosing appropriately. The information that the 
Potential Value of Opportunities view judges relevant to our evaluation of these policies is 
summarised in Table 3. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the value of the cells in Table 
3 as follows: [C, IE] stands for “the value of Curious’ opportunity set under Inform 
Everyone” and [W, VW] stands for “the value of Walker’s outcome under Vivid Warning”, 
etc. 
 
Table 3. The information relevant to our assessment of three policies on the 
Potential Value of Opportunities view. 
Policy 
 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone 
 
            
Vivid Warning 
 
 
Low Emissions 
Walker The value of the 
opportunity set: 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as best 
option; does not find 
(2) tempting. 
 
The value of the outcome: 
Severe, permanent 
health problems. 
The value of the outcome: 
Minor, temporary 
health problems. 
Curious  The value of the 
opportunity set: 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; is 
strongly tempted by 
(2). 
 
The value of the 
opportunity set: 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as best 
option; is somewhat 
tempted by (2), but 
does not find it 
difficult to resist 
temptation.  
The value of the 
opportunity set: 
1. Stay indoors; 
2. Go outside. 
Fully informed of 
consequences; (1) 
presents itself as best 
option; does not find 
(2) tempting. 
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 Let us now see what we should say about the potential value of the opportunity sets in 
question, starting with the comparison between Inform Everyone and Vivid Warning.30 In 
each of the three opportunity sets under consideration in this comparison, the worst option 
leads to a state in which one’s health is severely and permanently impaired. Each of these 
sets also contains an option which leads to a better outcome. Each of these opportunity 
sets therefore enables its possessor to achieve a better outcome than ending up with severe, 
permanent health damage without exposing its possessor to the danger of making a choice 
through which he or she would end up in a state that is worse than living with severe health 
damage. We should therefore regard these opportunity sets as more valuable than ending 
up in a state of severe, permanent health damage. It follows that each of [W, IE], [C, IE] 
and [C, VW] is greater than [W, VW]. 
 As we noted above, when an opportunity set exposes someone to the possibility that 
she will choose badly and come to harm as a result, then it exposes her to a danger. Being 
exposed to this danger is a bad thing, and renders her opportunity set less valuable. The 
magnitude of this danger is an increasing function of the magnitude of the harm and the 
degree to which she is disposed to act imprudently. As the magnitude of the danger 
increases, the value of her opportunities declines.31 
 This has the following implications for the relative value of the three opportunity sets 
under consideration. While Walker is not disposed to choose badly under Inform 
Everyone, Curious may be somewhat disposed to do so under Vivid Warning, and she is 
highly disposed to do so under Inform Everyone. Since the harm involved in choosing 
badly is the same in each case, it follows that the dangers that these opportunity sets pose 
are such that [W, IE]≥[C, VW]>[C, IE]. 
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 On the Potential Value of Opportunities view, we base our choice of policy on which 
policy leads to the preferable distribution of the value of people’s opportunities to choose 
(where they are informed, capable choosers) and the value of the outcome achieved (when 
they could not reasonably have been expected to avoid the outcome in question). In our 
case, this means that we should choose Inform Everyone, since the least valuable situation 
under Inform Everyone is more valuable than the least valuable situation under Vivid 
Warning—[C , IE]>[W, VW]—and  the most valuable situation is at least as valuable—[W, 
IE]≥[C, VW].32  
 The core of the argument for Inform Everyone is, in sum, very simple: we should 
choose Inform Everyone over Vivid Warning because under the former, Curious would 
have a valuable opportunity to avoid harm that Walker would not have under the latter. 
 Let us now turn to the choice between Inform Everyone and Low Emissions. Curious’ 
least valuable option under Low Emissions leads to the same outcome that Walker ends up 
with under that policy, and her most valuable option leads to a better outcome. Her 
opportunity set under Low Emissions is therefore more valuable than Walker’s situation 
under the same policy, because it enables her to achieve a better outcome than Walker 
achieves without exposing her to the danger of ending up in a worse condition than he will 
end up in: [C, LE]>[W, LE]. We have already established that Walker’s opportunities under 
Inform Everyone are better than Curious’ opportunities under that policy, since Curious 
will face a danger of choosing badly and Walker will not: [W, IE]>[C, IE]. If we could now 
establish that the least valuable situation under Low Emissions will be more valuable than 
the least valuable situation under Inform Everyone, and the most valuable situation will be 
at least as valuable, then it would follow that we should prefer Low Emissions to Inform 
Everyone. 
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 Start with the comparison of the most valuable situations under each policy, [C, LE] 
and [W, IE]. Curious’ first-best alternative under Low Emissions is just as good as Walker’s 
first-best alternative under Inform Everyone, and her second-best alternative is better than 
his second-best alternative. Moreover, the second-best alternative is not tempting for either 
of them. Since the quality of her opportunities dominates the quality of Walker’s, and both 
are entirely disposed to choose well from their opportunity sets, it follows that [C, 
LE]≥[W, IE].33 
 Now compare the least valuable situation under each policy, [W, LE] and [C, IE]. As 
discussed, Curious is exposed to a significant danger under Inform Everyone because she is 
strongly disposed to choose an option which leads to great harm. The present question is 
whether this danger so diminishes the value of her opportunities that they are less valuable 
than a state in which one suffers a minor, temporary ailment. The argument that it does 
diminish the value of her opportunities to this extent runs as follows. When our decisions 
shape people’s circumstances of choice, people have a claim to be placed in circumstances 
in which they are disposed to choose well and to avoid harm. In the case under 
consideration, we are therefore required to give the aim of lessening the danger of coming 
to harm through poor choices some weight in our decision-making. Moreover, though we 
are entitled to give priority to eliminating dangers that people cannot avoid by choosing 
well over eliminating dangers that they can so avoid, this priority is not absolute. As the 
magnitude of the danger of coming to harm through choosing badly increases vis-à-vis the 
magnitude of the danger of suffering harm that one cannot avoid by choosing 
appropriately, there is therefore a point at which the claim to be rid of the danger of ending 
up badly through one’s choice becomes stronger than the claim to be rid of the danger that 
one will suffer a harm that one cannot avoid by choosing appropriately. In my view, this 
point is reached in this case: given the great difference in the magnitudes of the dangers 
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involved, Curious’ claim not to be placed in circumstances in which she will be strongly 
tempted to choose imprudently is greater than Walker’s claim not to suffer a minor, 
temporary ailment. It follows that [W, LE]>[C, IE], which completes the argument in 
favour of Low Emissions. 
 The core of the argument for choosing Low Emissions over Inform Everyone is, 
therefore, that Low Emissions removes a significant danger that Curious will choose badly 
and come to great harm as a result, and that this improvement in her circumstances of 
choice outweighs the minor harm that Walker will come to under Low Emissions. 
 In sum, by appealing to the value of being given an opportunity to avoid harm, and the 
value of being placed in circumstances in which one is disposed to make good use of this 
opportunity, the Potential Value of Opportunities view can explain our judgments in our 
two cases in an appealing way. It explains the priority we give to preventing harm that a 
person cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over harm that a person can so avoid by 
the fact that the second person has a valuable opportunity that the first does not. It 
explains the importance of protecting people against choosing badly by its account of the 
value of being placed in circumstances in which one is disposed to choose well, and the 
disvalue of being exposed to the danger of coming to harm by choosing badly. The 
Potential Value of Opportunities view therefore appears to offer a promising account of 
the role of a person’s opportunities to choose in the justification of social arrangements. 
                                                 
1 I thank Elisabeth Anderson, Constanze Binder, Luc Bovens, Nancy Cartwright, Keith Dowding, Cécile 
Fabre, Marc Fleurbaey, Wulf Gaertner, Michael Otsuka, Leif Wenar, Jonathan Wolff for comments and 
discussion. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Popper Seminar at LSE in November 2004, at 
the Workshop on Law and Economics at the World Congress of Legal and Social Philosophy in Granada in 
May 2005, the Political Theory Seminar at Nuffield College, Oxford in October 2005, and the Workshop on 
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Rationality and Normative Economics at the LSE in November 2005. I am grateful to those present for their 
comments and suggestions. 
2 I follow Thomas Scanlon in distinguishing substantive responsibility from other senses of responsibility. 
(see What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 21-2; 248, 272 and 
278). My discussion of substantive responsibility is limited to the question of how we should set up 
arrangements that will make people’s claims, obligations and situation depend on their options and choices. I 
will assume that before we put these arrangements into place, no one has claims based on prior choices; nor 
does anyone have entitlements, or special claims to the benefits and burdens in question. I will also leave 
aside claims based on desert. 
3 See What We Owe to Each Other, p. 257. It is important to note how my version of the hazardous waste 
example differs from Scanlon’s. In his version, we have already justifiably chosen a particular policy which 
involved standard warnings to the citizens to stay indoors. Though an attempt was made to inform everyone, 
one person remained uninformed. As a consequence, in Scanlon’s version, Curious has come to harm 
because the standard warning piqued her curiosity and she impetuously visited the excavation site, and Walker 
has come to harm because he was uninformed of the danger. Scanlon then asks which factors we could 
appeal to in order to explain to these people why our policy was justified. I believe our central question is 
brought into sharper focus by re-framing the example as involving a choice between arrangements under 
which either Curious or Walker, but not both, come to harm. Since I have modelled Curious’ situation under 
Inform Everyone and Walker’s situation under Vivid Warning to be just as Scanlon imagines them to be in 
his original example, I believe we can use Scanlon’s remarks on what we can say to these two characters by 
way of justification of a policy under which they come to harm as indicative of the grounds Scanlon would 
adduce for choosing between the two policies I have imagined. 
4 Studies report that respondents tend to give priority to the reduction of harm that people cannot reasonably 
be expected to avoid over the reduction of harm that people can avoid by choosing appropriately. (Though 
they are generally willing to devote significant resources to the prevention of harms that people could avoid 
through their choices.) See Chauncey Starr, ‘Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk. What Is Our Society 
Willing to Pay for Safety?’ Science 165 (1969): 1232-8; Baruch Fischoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, 
Stephen Read, and Barbara Combs, ‘How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes towards 
Technological Risks and Benefits,’ Policy Science 9 (1978): 127-52; John D. Graham, ‘Some Explanations for 
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Disparities in Lifesaving Investments,’ Policy Studies Review 1 (1982): 692-704; Uma Subramanian and Maureen 
Cropper, ‘Public Choices between Lifesaving Programs. The Trade-off between Qualitative Factors and Lives 
Saved,’ Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 21 (2000): 117-49; Erik Schokkaert and Kurt Devooght, ‘Responsibility-
Sensitive Fair Compensation in Different Cultures,’ Social Choice and Welfare 21 (2003): 207-242 and Eve 
Wittenberg, Sue Goldie, Baruch Fischoff, and John Graham, ‘Rationing Decisions and Individual 
Responsibility for Illness: Are All Lives Equal?’ Journal of Medical Decision-Making 23 (2003): 194-211. For some 
less clear-cut results, see Wulf Gaertner and Lars Schwettmann, ‘Equity, Responsibility and the Cultural 
Dimension,’ Economica (2007, in press). 
5 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 258. 
6 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 259. 
7 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 258. 
8 What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 251-3. 
9 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 257. 
10 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 261-3. 
11 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 261. 
12 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 263. 
13 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 261. 
14 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 259. 
15 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 205 and p. 263. 
16 See Scanlon, ‘Preference and Urgency,’ reprinted in Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 70-83 and ‘The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons’, in 
Interpersonal Cmparisons of Well-Being, eds. Jon Elster and John Roemer. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 17-44. 
17 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 205. 
18 It is, for example, no different in kind to the information used by governments who are considering 
replacing written descriptions of smoking-caused health damage on cigarette packages with vivid images 
depicting the same harm because the latter are more effective. See David Hammond, Geoffrey T. Fong, Ron 
Borland, K. Michael Cummings, Ann McNeill, Pete Driezen, ‘Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette 
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Packages: Findings from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Study’, American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine 32:3 (2007): 202-9. 
19 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 259. 
20 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 258. 
21 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 260. 
22 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 259. 
23 What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 259-60. 
24 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 262. 
25 What We Owe to Each Other, p. 262, emphasis in original. 
26 Similar criticism of views of responsibility that appear to be close to the Forfeiture view is offered by Marc 
Fleurbaey, ‘Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?’ Economics and Philosophy 11 (1995): 25-55; Elisabeth 
Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337 and Richard Arneson, ‘Luck and 
Equality,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 75 (2001): 73-90. These papers do not, 
however, share my diagnosis of the problem with the Forfeiture view, namely, that it does not account for the 
badness of being exposed to the danger of choosing badly. 
27 This danger of choosing badly is distinct from the costs that the presence of a tempting option might 
impose on a prudent decision-maker, and which the Forfeiture view might be able to take into account. 
Examples of such costs are the time and mental effort involved in decision-making, the steps that the 
decision-maker would have to take to avoid choosing imprudently, and any feelings of frustration which 
would flow from failing to satisfy her desire for the tempting option. For a discussion of some costs of 
choosing, see also Gerald Dworkin, ‘Is More Choice Better Than Less?’ in his The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 62-81. 
28 The following comments draw on Aristotle’s discussion in the Nichomachean Ethics (translated and edited by 
Terence Irwin, second edition, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999) on the nature of our knowledge in acting 
imprudently in 1146b33-1147b19, 1150a20-29 and 1151a1-4. I am indebted to Luc Bovens for helpful 
discussions on this topic. 
29 Dirk Vandegaer, in his Equality of Opportunity and Investments in Human Capital. (Ph.D. Thesis, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, 1993) and his subsequent work, and John Roemer, in his Equality of Opportunity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), have developed social choice rules which are based on the 
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value of individuals’ opportunities. I follow these authors in addressing questions of substantive responsibility 
by appealing to the value of a person’s opportunities. I also agree with them that in evaluating a person’s 
opportunities, we should take account of all his options and his dispositions to choose. However, as Matthias 
Hild and I have argued in ‘Equal Opportunity and Opportunity Dominance,’ Economics and Philosophy 20 
(2004): 117-45, I believe Roemer’s and Vandegaer’s measures are flawed in various ways. (See also Marc 
Fleurbaey, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare, book manuscript [2006].) The principles for ranking opportunity 
sets that I put forward here are an attempt to develop an alternative to Vandegaer’s and Roemer’s measures 
that is not vulnerable to this criticism. Another interesting contribution which draws on Roemer’s work is 
Peter Vallentyne, ‘Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities,’ Ethics 112 (2002): 529-
557. While I believe that Vallentyne’s measure of the value of a person’s opportunities inherits the flaws of 
Roemer’s approach, I share the view expressed on p. 549ff of his article that taking account of a person’s 
dispositions to choose in evaluating her opportunity set can ensure that one accounts for the value of 
protecting people against choosing poorly. 
30 In line with my assumption in section 1, I will focus only on the potential instrumental value of a person’s 
opportunities. A fuller account would include the contribution that other forms of value, such as the 
aforementioned symbolic and expressive value and perhaps the value of autonomy, make to the potential 
value of a person’s opportunities. The literature reviewed in Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert, and Prasanta 
Pattanaik, ‘Ranking Sets of Objects,’ Chapter 17 in The Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 2, edited by Salvador 
Barberà, Peter Hammond and Christian Seidl (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming) may 
provide an interesting starting point for this work. 
31 Of course, being exposed to the danger of coming to harm through choosing badly differs from being 
exposed to a danger that one cannot avoid by choosing appropriately. In line with the common judgments 
outlined at the start of this paper, we should hold that the person who would face a danger that she could 
avoid by choosing appropriately has less of a claim for this danger to be eliminated than someone who would 
face an equivalent danger that she could not so avoid. In our example, this implies that though the value of 
Curious’ opportunity set under Inform Everyone is diminished because she will be tempted to act in a way 
that leads to her suffering severe, lasting health damage, her opportunity set is nonetheless more valuable 
than a state in which a person will certainly suffer a harm of the same severity that he could not reasonably be 
expected to avoid. 
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32 We are therefore entitled to choose Inform Everyone no matter which of the standard methods for 
evaluating distributions we use. Inform Everyone will be better than Vivid Warning from the perspective of 
leximin, prioritarianism, and the sum-total of the value in question, because the least valuable situation under 
Inform Everyone is more valuable than the least valuable situation under Vivid Warning and the most 
valuable situation is at least as valuable. It is better by the Complaint Model because the size of Walker’s 
complaint against Vivid Warning is greater than the size of Curious’ complaint against Inform Everyone (for 
a discussion of the Complaint Model, see What We Owe to Each Other, p. 229). 
33 The reason that we cannot conclude that [C, LE]>[W, IE] is that it is not clear that either opportunity set 
involves any danger of choosing badly. Given that neither chooser is disposed to choose the second-best 
option, one might argue that the fact that Walker’s second-best option under Inform Everyone is worse than 
Curious’ second-best option under Low Emissions is of no importance for the evaluation of their 
opportunity sets. 
